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Scholasticism Looks Forward Editorial

THE philosophy behind our modern civilization has received perhaps the heaviest blows at the hands of contemporary critics. And in the light of this attack on fundamental thought it would at least seem just to demand that Scholasticism as a workable philosophy of life be given her turn at the helm before reason is finally depaired of. Indeed, Scholasticism is preparing itself nobly for that task. The doctrines of Aristotle and Aquinas are being studied today not merely as matter of interest for the historian. The really important researches into the writings of these intellectual giants are being carried on with a view to the positive worth of their teachings. M. Maritain is one among many others who is convinced that the solution for the philosophical evils of our time, to say nothing of the economic, social, and religious aspects, can be found in the works of St. Thomas. Surely we do not propose simply to translate the *Summa Theologica* into twentieth century phraseology and let it go at that. There is need of much more; mere reiteration will never do. For we are not facing problems identical with but only similar to those of the early Schoolmen.

In view of the collapse of order, then, the future of Scholasticism as a strict philosophy is very inspiring, and that for several reasons. First, true Scholastic thought is more available today than it has ever been before; and secondly, the drastic situation in which we find ourselves calls for a thorough investigation of the fundamentals of our whole Western philosophy of life. The contempt that is being daily showered upon the shibboleths which satisfied our fathers is proof enough that we are looking for a sane philosophy—a philosophy which, as Father D'Arcy has put it, is intellectually watertight.

The doctrines of the Schoolmen have suffered enormously at the hands of many historians of philosophy. For not a few of them philosophy was born into this world with Descartes, and the thousands of years before him are simply passed by. The developments of Plato and Aristotle in Augustine and Plotinus, and the remarkable combination of all of these in Aquinas, are simply obliterated in the general term Dark Ages. Scholasticism as it was at the time of Descartes was indeed marked by many shortcomings. Yet we must remember that the Scholasticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not the same system of thought which we know to-

day, and by no means the glowing system of thought envisaged by the Angelic Doctor. Strictly speaking, to call it Scholasticism at all is a mistake.

The excellent results of the Neo-Scholastic movement both in America and abroad, however, have given us quite a different knowledge of Aristotle and St. Thomas. As a consequence, we are in a position today that is ideal for a true and complete understanding of Scholastic teaching in its purity. Our view is no longer warped by eccentricities of thought which can prejudice us from the very start. We are quite free of all nominalistic tendencies which influenced the early followers of Aquinas, as well as of the subjectivism of Descartes and its influence upon all subsequent philosophies.

There is another great fact which likewise substantiates our belief that Scholasticism is coming into its own. It is the fact that modern philosophy is in chaos. Here again we are struck by the need for a full understanding of the primary concepts of reality. The lack of such first principles is more manifest in the professions and the sciences as such. Political scientists are spending a great deal of time trying to devise a system of social and economic reconstruction. Of course, we must set up "the good" as our end to be achieved, but what do we mean by "the good"? We are all agreed that there are evils aplenty in our present system; yet what should we put in its place? Here begins the parting of the ways.

Yet all of this seems to show it is time that we have recourse to a radicalism of some sort. Surely we do need to go to the roots of things. Why not return to metaphysics? For can anything good and true and lasting come from a false notion of reality's *prima principia*? If our explanation of the "*ens reale*" is untrue, it follows that we are necessarily wrong in explaining the "*bonum*." For *ens et bonum convertuntur*.

The true radicalness or the radical trueness of the philosophy of being is, we believe, the one hope of salvation for modern thought. There is the need and, what is peculiar to our time, there is the ready access to the original and untainted sources of that philosophy. Finally, however, we must depend upon the intellectual honesty of man. By the God-given faculty of reason he has the power to override the impulses of sense and prejudice. Which course will our leaders of thought follow?

Wisdom Hath Built Herself a House

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AMONG the Scholastic philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century M. Étienne Gilson certainly stands in the front rank. In the numerous studies of great philosophical systems which have issued from his pen he has shown himself not merely a historian, but a genuine philosopher. It is his peculiar contribution to the *philosophia perennis* that he has recreated the ideas of the men whom he has studied and enlivened them with the vitality of a philosophical mind of rare quality. In an age which is singularly anti-philosophical he has done much to keep the flame of philosophy burning.

M. Gilson has merited this tribute, if for no other reason, by a work which he published a few years ago entitled *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*. Here M. Gilson rises to a universal view of that medieval philosophy, embracing several schools, which has won for itself the title of Christian. It is precisely this title which is the object of M. Gilson's reflections. Can there be such a thing, he asks, as Christian philosophy? And, if it is possible, does such a philosophy in fact exist? That there can be such a philosophy he is at some pains to demonstrate; that the philosophy of medieval Scholasticism is a Christian philosophy he expends two volumes in expounding; and here he sets forth the notion of Christian philosophy very precisely as: *philosophie qui, bien que distinguant formellement les deux ordres, considère la révélation Chrétienne comme une auxiliaire indispensable de la raison*. (A philosophy which, though formally distinguishing between the two orders, considers Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary of reason.)

Philosophy is subject to the laws of the organic world in this, that growth is the basis of life and vital activity; let growth and progress cease in any philosophical system, and it becomes one of those historical phenomena which stand like tombstones along the avenue of thought. That Christian philosophy may live, then, it must grow; no single man or group of men have settled it once for all, or have perfected it beyond the possibility of further development; in the province of the unknown there still lie large tracts of unexplored wilderness which await the philosopher, and the Christian philosopher before all. It is the merit of Christian philosophy that, formed as it was by the medieval giants, it is still alive and active in the modern world.

What, we may ask, gives to Christian philosophy this peculiar vitality which it possesses? What is the secret power which keeps its speculations from turning barren, as has been the fate of practically all the famous philosophies of the past? The answer is brief: the fact that this philosophy is Christian; its life, its activity, its fertility is

its Christianity. It derives its philosophical vigor from a source which is not philosophical; and it illumines the natural with a light which is kept burning by the oil of the supernatural. This notion is fraught with significance.

I may begin with a little fable which, unfortunately is no fable. Once upon a time a French soldier who was campaigning in Germany came upon a German inn in the evening of a cold winter day; and being a soldier, and being human, he would fain enter and partake of the joy of a cozy nook and a glass of spirits. So enter he did and sat himself down behind the stove; and over his glass he fell to musing on the great mystery of reality. And as he thus mused, he wondered how he might best come to the true contemplation of reality. Being a good Catholic Christian, he at once excepted from his inquiries the truth of his faith; for these did not belong to the sphere of reason, but were all set down in the Scriptures and the canon of Holy Mother Church. But for all else, he found no satisfactory key to reality in all the dreamings of philosophers; he would then cast off all these dreams as idle and vain. Reason would weigh anchor and cruise off into an unknown sea with no charts or compass but her own nose. Wisdom would build herself a house.

Now it seems no exaggeration to say that this French soldier by his foolish speculations behind the stove set the calendar of philosophy back some two thousand years. I do not refer to the fact that his reason, navigating solitary upon a solitary sea, brought back the largest cargo of philosophical errors since Plato, but to this, that as the method and condition of his speculations he chose to cleave reality in twain; to assign reason an autonomous province of her own and exclude her from the dominion of faith. I refer to his engineering of what, for the sake of convenience we may call the Cartesian gulf.

For the medieval Scholastics the Cartesian gulf did not exist. They met and vanquished the same error in a more malignant form as proposed by the disciples of Averroes, who devised the hideous doctrine of the double standard of truth—reason and revelation. The medieval Scholastics viewed reality as a unity; they saw, with the Psalmist, that the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows forth the works of His hands. But they also saw what the Psalmist had yearned to see, and had not seen; that God had not only spoken through the heavens and the firmament, but through His Incarnate Son. The Word of truth had been made flesh and dwelt amongst us. For them the key to this reality was not human reason, but divinity; as reality is made a unity by the hand of its Creator, so science is a unity in the search for God.

In such a philosophy there are not two kingdoms and

laws. The truths of reason are not unchristian, nor truths of Christianity unreasonable. Reason and revelation are two searchlights which play on one and the same object. It never occurred to these philosophers to reject reality; they sought a synthesis, not a catalysis. And they were the more disinclined to establish two separate kingdoms of truth because they saw that reason, in her attempts to rule an autonomous province, had exacted some shocking misgovernment.

Now, then, were they to view reality? As it is. What hath joined together, let no man put asunder. The natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine, have been united in one Person. More than that, the natural and the supernatural remained united in the work of the Spirit which was poured out upon all flesh, and which is to remain until the consummation of the world. The supernatural is not a superstructure; it is an elevation. Let the philosopher deal with it as such. In the Kingdom of grace the world is not what it was before; man is under a new dispensation. If reason is to see things aright, it must take account of these new elements in its scheme of things; for these new elements pierce to the heart of that which is the center of the visible creation and man himself.

What kind of science shall it be that treats of this reality?

The medievals envisaged a science that should be as the reality that it represents is one; it should accept as its source and criterion of truth both the light of reason and the light of faith, just as in reality itself the workings of Nature and of Nature's God are mingled in one vast harmony; and either of these sources is of itself inadequate for a philosophic grasp of truth in its unity and totality. It is the architectonic science which the medievals would construct; they would complete the Augustinian tradition and integrate their science towards one end—the *Beatitudo veritatis et veritas beatitudinis* (the blessedness of truth and the truth of blessedness).

Now to those who have split the world of knowledge by the Cartesian gulf such a proceeding seems to starve the mind greedy for truth. Fools! As though this were the greatest honor of reason, to arrogate to itself a fancied independence of Him who made it; as though the divine intellect from whose ineffable depths sprang this great harmony of reasoned order were not a fit object for that intimacy in His creature which is closest to Himself; as though reason were sterilized in a union with Him from whom she derives all her fecundity! This is indeed to put a cart several miles in front of the horse, and then to be in amazement because it doesn't go.

For there are those who have turned their reason loose on pasture and wax fat in the green felicity of what is called the domain of reason. Reason hath waxed fat and dined; she has testified through her most devout hierophants that the universe is a great mystery which it is not in the mind of man to fathom; and hence she denies that she can know anything for certain. Balaam's ass prophesied; for reason ruling supreme has declared

that her domain is far too large for her to handle; she preens herself for discovering that the more she finds out about her domain, the less she knows about it; but, unfortunately, she draws thence the utterly unwarranted conclusion that she can know nothing about it at all.

Then there be others who, quite logically, have not exercised their reason in what is called the supernatural; but since we have not another cognitive faculty corresponding to reason for the other side of the Cartesian gulf, they have been sore put to it to get any *rapprochement* with the supernatural at all. I should not call it supernatural, as this would imply that it is in some way superior to that which reason claims as her own, and this the theological investigators in question would never admit; so let us use their own terms and call it the sphere of religious experience. In this sphere man ceases to be a rational animal and becomes a palpitating jellyfish. He does not know in any way at all; he simply registers. He goes into a coma and communes with the Ablative Absolute, or some such nonsense, and comes out all flushed and happy and emotionally inebriated at the sight of things which it is not given to other men to see. But they can see them if they too will become mystics; if they sit down in some bosky dell and expose themselves to impulses from vernal woods, they will find that what they thought was their foot going to sleep is really a personal communication from divinity.

And now that the Cartesian gulf has put reason and religious experience in their proper places, what have we? We have a science whose greatest boast is that it is no science, but a happy series of good guesses, and that the lordly reason can do no more. We have a theology whose knowledge of God consists of certain throbs in the pericardiac region. We have a science which stands helpless with tons of food rotting away on one side, and millions of hungry mouths on the other; and it cannot take one step to bridge the gap. We have a religion which is teaching the young how to shoot and rob and merit hanging before they are old enough to use a razor. We have both together pouring out money like water to invest in cannons and cannon fodder and diplomatic lies; we have them both encouraging the humane practices of suicide, infant murder, mutilation, and home-blasting, and all in order to elevate the race to a higher level of culture. We have far more work to do for the good of the race than this generation can ever hope to do, and men standing idle in the market place because no one has hired them. And most remarkable of all, we have this ignorant science and this dyspeptic religion bleating in press, pulpit, and platform that this is progress. And they say Christianity has sterilized science! Christianity has blocked the road of progress! Would that she could have sterilized such science, and blocked the road of such progress; but it is her fate to be the Cassandra of world history.

Mr. Chesterton recently observed to an interviewer that he is the kind of man who could not even write on Dutch gardens or chess without his writing being colored by his view of the cosmos. This remark illustrates exactly the

unity of Christian philosophy and indicates the source of its fertility. For the Christian philosopher the central problem of reality is the problem of the God who made reality; and the key to that problem is the voice of God Himself. His world-view is a world-view dominated by Divinity; and in the light of that world-view he pushes forward his investigations to the ultimate limits of things. There is no problem to which he cannot give some answer, even though there remain many a mystery which his reason cannot penetrate and which his dogma leaves unsolved; but of this he is sure, and this he can demonstrate: reality, even where it is most mysterious, is never unreasonable; his reason does not abdicate its power and sit down helpless before the great riddle. Is this Christian method unreasonable? On the contrary, by no other method can the speculations of reason continue fruitful. The facts bear witness; when wisdom built herself a house, she left off the roof.

It is this security, this confidence in the possession of the central truth, which makes Christian philosophy fruitful—the *philosophia perennis*. Christian philosophy fears no truth, and it knows that it can grasp truth; for in its view of things as a unity and totality it knows that it will find everywhere the *splendor ordinis*. It has the courage to push into the farthest recesses of the heavens, the ultimate particles of matter, the innermost depths of life, the most profound secrets of human nature. Nay, it does not fear to advance into that great world beyond reason; for it knows that that world, however far it transcends reason, never contradicts it. By a strange paradox reason is most powerful when it admits its insufficiency; and by a

stranger paradox Christian philosophy is vigorously attacked by the high priests of reason because that philosophy vindicates for reason its right to possess truth.

Now it seems time that the high priests of reason should see the monstrosity which they have built; that they should confess their utter failure. Had they been attentive, they would have seen that Christian philosophy has stubbornly pointed away from the rocks on which an autonomous reason has blindly wrecked itself. They should have learned by this time that speculation on dogma is eminently reasonable, and that speculation without dogma is eminently unreasonable. They should have seen that Christian philosophy fructifies for human happiness, while autonomous reason is the mother of deceit and strife.

Vita, igitur, quae istorum tam magnorum tamque gravium malorum aut premitur oneribus, aut subjacet casibus, nullo modo beata diceretur, si homines, qui hoc dicunt, sicut victi malis ingravescentibus, cum sibi ingerunt mortem, cedunt felicitati, ita victi certis rationibus, cum quaerunt beatam vitam, dignarentur cedere veritati, et non sibi putarent in ista mortalitate fine summi boni esse gaudendum.

(That life, then, which is either subject to accidents, or environed with evils so considerable and grievous, could never have been called happy, if the men who gave it this name had condescended to yield to truth. [Nor would it have been so called] had these men not fancied that the supreme good was to be found in this mortal life; but like those who are overcome by overwhelming evils yield to unhappiness by committing suicide, so were they vanquished by certain arguments.)¹

REFERENCES

¹ St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. XIX, 4.

The State and Natural Rights

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A RECENT statement of Mr. Herbert Hoover is being quoted with approval. It runs as follows: "The objective of American life must be to uphold and protect the family and the home, whether of farmer, worker, or business man. That is the unit of American life. It is the moral and spiritual as well as the economic unit. With its independence and security come the spiritual blessings of the nation."

This statement that the State should protect the family as the social unit is correct and in full accord with the teaching of Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical on *Christian Democracy*. Mr. Hoover's statement cannot be questioned, but his failure as president to use any means to realize what he terms the "objective of American life" calls for adverse criticism. President Roosevelt has made a sincere effort to conquer the depression, and it must be admitted that the state of the Union was better on March 4, 1935, than it was on March 4, 1933.

The statement mentioned above which correctly as-

sumes that the family is the social unit also presupposes certain rights enjoyed by the family independently of civil society, which the State, in accordance with its God-given end, has the duty to protect. As the New Deal takes it for granted that man has the inherent right to life and, in consequence, the right to acquire property, work, to receive a living wage, and to join his fellow laborers and bargain collectively, it is decidedly alarming to see these natural rights denied by the President's chief adviser, Mr. Donald Richberg.

Here are his exact words, used in an interview given to a New York paper in November, 1934: "The right of property did not come by nature, they were created by law. If it were not for law there could be no inheritance; for instance, there could be no way of passing on property. Every single right and protection the individual has in our society has been created legally."¹ (Italics mine.) You will observe that Mr. Richberg is not talking about the protection of rights but their creation. Hegel's Absolu-

therefore, replaces the United States of America and all rights; and presumably what it gives it can away. It is interesting to note that some professors of the two educational institutions which are responsible for Mr. Richberg's degrees in Arts and Law have often recited the decalogue, whose precepts, "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal," back up the natural rights of life and property.

Are our institutions of learning partly responsible for the fact that thirty-six states of the Union, in their abortion statutes, and twenty-seven, in their sterilization laws, have attacked the right to life?

The workingmen who have received a "raw deal" and are looking for the New Deal, championed by the administration, are amply justified in looking askance at the college adviser. Some of the college graduates, now wearing caps and gowns, are beginning to recall the familiar saying: *Ne Danaos et dona ferentes*. They wonder what the President, Mr. Richberg, will do, especially as he seems to have forgotten the Declaration of Independence and that venerable document, which, in the eyes of many, was its ideal and prototype—the Virginia Bill of Rights.

Jefferson's Preamble to the Declaration of Independence we find these words:

We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. . . . But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them (the citizens) under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

The Virginia Bill of Rights is equally clear:

All men are born equally free and independent and have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing property and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety . . . (moreover) government is instituted for the common benefit and security of the people, nation, or community.

American democracy, therefore, we may remind Mr. Richberg, respects natural rights and declares that civil government must acknowledge and protect them. Cardinal Mercier, after rejecting the view that private ownership is a legal right, inasmuch as it logically precedes every social compact, adds these words: "An agreement may not transfer the transference of a right, or regulate its use, but no agreement can create one."²

Equally strong in his vindication of the right to acquire property as a natural right is John Locke, one of Thomas Jefferson's favorite philosophers:

The supreme power cannot take from any man part of his property without his own consent; for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering

into society, which was the end for which they entered into it: too gross an absurdity for any man to own.³ (Italics mine.)

Daniel Webster, unlike Mr. Richberg, held that man had rights that were not created by the State. At the New England Society dinner in 1851 he spoke out boldly, as Jefferson had done before him, for the right of religious liberty: "It is established as our principle that a man's religion is a matter above human law, because he is responsible to none but his Maker for it."

Abraham Lincoln wrote his friend, Joshua Speed, a strong letter on this same natural right, in which, among other things, he says:

I am not a Know-Nothing, that's certain. . . . Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that "all men are created equal". . . . When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read "all men except. . . Catholics". When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty. . . . where despotism can be taken pure and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.

If Mr. Richberg's view about rights is correct, the right of a man to defend his life against an unjust aggressor or to protect his property is a thing of the past. Calles and Cárdenas and the other Mexican robbers and murderers would enjoy the friendship of the Divine Lawgiver: for, by legal enactments, they would secure the right to the property of the Catholic churches and also the right to slay innocent people. Japan could pass a law conferring upon itself the title to the Philippine Islands. Fifty years ago, laborers who tried to form unions were thrown into prison by the English government. If all rights are merely legal, this punishment was not unjust. The State could justly attach a penalty to any effort on the part of the laboring classes to form a labor organization, if they had no legal right to do so (the only kind admitted in the theory of the Absolute State).

At this stage of our study we may inquire, first, what rights are natural; secondly, what proof we have that they exist, and thirdly, what the State's attitude ought to be towards them. Those rights are called natural that spring from our very nature and arise from the fact that we are human beings, endowed with intellect and free will. Animals cannot have any rights whatsoever, because they are not persons, endowed with these spiritual faculties.

A right is a moral inviolable power that a human being enjoys as a protection against his fellow men. If, for example, I have a right to life, all others have a duty not to tamper with that right. If they ignore that duty and violate my right, God, who gave me that moral, inviolable right over my life, will mete out punishment to them. Among these natural rights are the right to life, the right to acquire property, the right to a living wage, to join a union and under certain conditions to strike, the right to freedom of conscience, freedom of speech within certain limits, the right of personal liberty, the right to marry, and the right (of a parent) to educate his children.

As to our second query, namely, about the existence of natural rights, we may say, with Sullivan,⁴ that right, or

the moral, inviolable power to do or to hold or exact something, is derived from man's obligation to observe the moral law and exists independently of any positive law. Subjective right (of which there is question in our discussion) is derived from man's obligation to observe the moral law, if, without it, man could not fulfill this obligation; for God cannot will the end, namely, the fulfillment of duty, without willing the means necessary to that end. But, without subjective right, man could not fulfill that obligation; for other men would not have the corresponding duty of respecting his rational dignity and independence and the use of those things which he has made his own. Hence, man's right is essentially linked with his duty as a creature to observe the moral law imposed by the Creator. As an individual, therefore, whose existence is prior to that of the State, man has those natural rights that are necessary for the proper observance of the natural law. How then can all rights come from the positive law, when the natural law and natural rights are the foundation of the positive law and positive rights? How can the individual and family, which cannot exist without rights, derive those rights from a State which is posterior to them and does not yet exist? How foolish of Kant, whom Roscoe Pound and other jurists praise so extravagantly, to separate the juridical order from the moral law! Is not the moral law, in part at least, juridical? If so, the natural juridical order, a part of the moral law, is the foundation of the positive juridical order. The latter, therefore, is indissolubly linked with the moral law. If this is denied, God, the Author of the moral law, contradicts Himself. Through the natural law, for example, He gives Mexican parents the natural right to educate their children, and imposes upon Calles, Cárdenas, and others of their ilk, the obligation to respect that right. Then, by means of the civil law, whose authority comes from Him through the natural law of which He is the direct author, He confers the *positive right* (in sharp conflict with the duty of non-interference mentioned above) of educating these same children. In other words, God confers upon the parents the right to educate their offspring, and then, through the duty of corresponding to the positive right granted by the State to Mexican officials, makes it sinful for parents to use their right—a plain contradiction.

Do not the advocates of statolatry realize that they impugn the wisdom of God when they deny natural rights or break the bond uniting civil law with natural law and positive rights with natural rights? What would these juridical positivists say about the murder of Abel by Cain? Abel's right to life and the duty to respect it which Cain violated would not have originated in a positive juridical order and a civil society which did not exist at the time. Hence they must come from the natural law and the natural juridical order. If you deny this, Cain did not murder Abel. If you admit this, you concede the existence of natural rights.

Against juridical positivists, we defend natural rights

and maintain that these natural rights have their origin in the natural law. Hence we are not surprised that those who deny the existence of natural rights ridicule the natural law. These two stand or fall together. That there is a natural law is evident from the fact that Divine Providence, which is the execution of the natural law, is generally admitted. Moreover, God, as an infinitely wise Legislator, must by His eternal law direct everything that He creates towards its proper end in accordance with its nature. Inasmuch as a physical law, such as brute animals have, would destroy man's freedom, he must be guided by a moral law, which is in full accord with his rational nature.

To say, therefore, that there is no natural law or that the moral law is not divine in its origin, involves a patent contradiction. This natural law is the source of man's duties and therefore of his rights. Without natural rights a person cannot live a reasonable life; that is, so live here below that this present existence will prepare him for his final state of perfection and happiness in the life unending beyond the grave. Many modern critics of our theory of natural rights say that the individual has no right which society may not, in certain circumstances, repudiate for its own welfare. Edmund Burke, forgetting the axiom, *Stans medio virtus* adopts this extreme view in his work entitled *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in which he combats the diametrically opposed and equally extreme doctrine of those who promoted the French Revolution.

Mackenzie,⁵ too, accepting Hegel's illustration of civil society as an organism in which the personality of the citizens is merged and lost like the branch in the tree, makes this extreme statement: "*By himself, a man has no right to anything whatever.*" He is part of the social whole; and he has a right only to that, which it is for the good of the whole that he should have." (Italics mine.)

In this view man is a mere means to be used by the Absolute State, the source of all rights, as Hegel held, for the good of society as a whole. Fullerton, late professor of philosophy at Columbia University, says that the individual without the State "may be a being; but he is scarcely recognizable as a human being." He adds: "The State allots to individuals . . . rights and it prescribes to them duties." Speaking of certain rights, "which civilized states generally guarantee to their citizens," he says: "They make it the duty of their citizens to respect these rights in others." In other words, the State creates these rights!⁶

This same view is defended in Richtie's *Natural Rights*, Willoughby's *Social Justice*, and Austin's *Jurisprudence*. In Austin's work we read:

These rights have been called natural or inborn, merely because they arise *sine speciali titulo*; that is, reside in a party, merely as living under the protection or within the jurisdiction of the State. It is manifest, however, that they are not, properly speaking, natural or inborn; for they are as much the creatures of the law as any other legal rights.⁷ (Italics mine.)

kinhead, more correctly, refers to the "law of nature and nature's God" as the source of the "inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" ⁸ that lie at the basis of the United States Constitution. Quoting James Bryce's statement that "the sum and substance of the philosophy of law is the relation of law and ethics," Kinhead argues "a closer affinity between law and ethics in actual practice." Again he writes: "As the philosophy of the ancients beautified Roman law, so if our judges, lawyers, and legal writers, hug the principles of philosophy and are close to their bosoms, so much violence will not be done to the symmetry of our legal system." ⁹ Evidently, Kinhead disagrees with those who maintain "that lawyers do not have to be moral philosophers any more than any other class of persons." In fact, he makes this clear statement about the sciences of ethics and law: "Practically, the administration of justice, they become as one." He condemns Frederick Pollock's view that "experience is the source of morality" and lauds Justice Hunt's statement that "laws and morals . . . are unchangeable; they are the same yesterday and today." He also condemns utilitarianism as the standard of morality and adds that "there ought to be no law that is inconsistent with morality" and "no line was drawn between law and morality (by the Roman jurists)." He rightly approves Lorimer's statement that "God is the one primary source of natural law—the inevitable postulate of jurisprudence" and that the jurist is beholden to the metaphysician for the primary source of his science." Finally, Kinhead puts the force of his approval upon a statement in Ritter's *Moral and Civil Law*: "Morality cannot be disregarded by the legislature; it must be regarded, or the action of the body is void." (Italics mine.)

In reference to the third question, namely, the State's attitude towards natural rights, it is quite clear that it is the duty of recognizing and protecting them. This is evident from the twofold end of civil society, namely, to protect individual and family rights and to promote temporal public prosperity. In the historical order, first comes the individual, with his rights and duties, then the family with its rights and duties determined by its primary and secondary ends, and finally, because of the insufficiency of the family, as far as the protection of rights and the means necessary for temporal prosperity are concerned, the State. This is a self-evident explanation of the genesis of the State.

Different families living in the same locality at times quarrel about their respective rights. If peace and tranquillity are to prevail, as God wills, the matter must be settled. There is an exigency of a higher power, a union of families with an authority superior to that of the families themselves. This higher society or State must protect the rights that are jeopardized. This more perfect society supplementing the family, which the different families by a moral necessity banded together to form, must provide the opportunities that are socially necessary for the temporal welfare of the citizens.

Recognizing the prior natural rights of the individuals and families that constitute civil society, it is clearly the duty of the State to protect them. The State is bound by the natural law no less than the individual and the family. To hold otherwise would involve the absurd supposition that men could exempt themselves from the observance of the decalogue by forming into a State. We must, therefore, absolutely reject the view of Professor Willoughby of The Johns Hopkins University that the State is "independent and absolute." ¹⁰

Frank Chapman Sharp, ¹¹ whose textbook on ethics is rather widely used in secular universities, denies the theory of natural rights. He gives a false definition of the right to life and declares that it is not a natural right. He does not seem to know that God Himself made it clear that the fifth commandment means "Thou shalt not kill unjustly." Disregarding the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas taught the theory of natural rights, Sharp makes this statement: "This theory grew up in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."

Cicero's clear statement ¹² about the eternal and immutable natural law also supposes the existence of natural rights. Oliver Wendell Holmes ¹³ rejects natural law and natural rights. He says, in an article on Natural Law, that he disapproves "the jurist's search for criteria of universal validity which he collects under the head of natural law." He means that exceptions can be made to the commandments despite the fact that the natural law is supposed to be immutable. Misunderstanding the fifth commandment, like Professor Sharp, he adds: "The most fundamental of the supposed pre-existing rights—the right to life—is sacrificed without a scruple, not only in war, but whenever the interest of society—that is, of the predominant power in the community—is thought to demand it."

Those who favor State Absolutism should ponder on these words of Cardinal O'Connell: "It was thus that the State originated—it had its birth in the union of families, seeking the protection of their rights and the promotion of their temporal well-being. . . . The State, therefore, exists for the individual . . . the State is the servant, not the master of the people, and far from creating or determining their rights, it finds them already existing." ¹⁴

Professor Taylor, of the University of Michigan, admitting that the old view of a divine, unchangeable natural law which served as the basis of the positive law of the State had practically universal acceptance for twenty-two centuries, declares that this natural law "was the creed of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Gaius, Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Locke, and Kant." As Taylor belongs to the modern school that makes the State supreme—the Roscoe Pound-Holmes-Willoughby school—this admission is noteworthy.

Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School, who defends "pragmatism as a philosophy of law" declares that the word *right* has come to mean too much in the vocabulary of the lawyer. He is "skeptical as to the possibility of an absolute judgment." The writer could find

nothing in Pound's *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* that would suggest parting company with Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas. He did find a tribute to Scholastic philosophy for its "permanent contribution to legal science"¹⁵ and an admission that supplements Taylor's view, quoted above,—an admission that may serve as a conclusion to this paper: "Today, however, we hear of a revival of natural law. Philosophy of law is rearing its head throughout the world."¹⁶

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Maréchal's Theory of Dynamic Cognition

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JOSEPH MARÉCHAL, professor at Louvain, is quite generally acknowledged by modern philosophers and historians of philosophy as the most profound and original representative of the Scholastic, or Christian, philosophy of our time. This is so, in the first place, because he applies the principles of Scholasticism, chiefly of Thomism, to the modern problems proposed by Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Blondel, and Husserl. He is especially interested in the fundamental problem: How is metaphysics possible; what is, in the light of the theory of cognition, the *Apriori* which constitutes the scientific object and the series of judgments so fundamental in philosophy? Secondly, because in building up certain Scholastic principles he makes use of several important doctrines of modern philosophy; and this in a profound and creative way. He draws from the criticism of Kant and from his ingenious theory of the *Apriori*, from the doctrines of finalism and dynamism of all cognition as found in the philosophy of Fichte, as well as from more recent philosophers as Bonhoux, Lachelier, and Blondel.

On the other hand, Maréchal is acknowledged by the representatives of Scholastic philosophy as one of those who is best acquainted with Scholastic teaching. He carries through to its final applications, in strict logic, the most profound and complete system of Scholastic philosophy, that of St. Thomas Aquinas. He is master of the Angelic Doctor's metaphysics as well as of his theory of cognition, and sets forth the fundamental principles found there in an ingenious manner. In this paper, however, we shall not speak of Maréchal's many minor works, his psychology, or his researches in mysticism.

Certainly, in no science—with the one exception, per-

haps, of theology—does the history of the respective disciplines show such an essential and far-reaching influence as in philosophy. Leading philosophers very often work out their own theories by setting forth in a creative way the problems proposed in past and present. So it was with Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel; so is it also with Maréchal. He shows himself acquainted with the history of Greek, Medieval, and Modern philosophy; as a consequence, he is better able to sketch in clear outline the question at issue. We must pass over his *Précis d'histoire de la philosophie moderne* in three volumes the first of which was published in 1933, for our chief concern here and now is his great work *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*.

Here, in the light of the history of philosophy from Greek antiquity to modern times, Maréchal puts forth the evolution of the problem, "How is metaphysics possible?" as interpreted in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. And the climax of the opposition between Scholastic and modern philosophy, this creative, original synthesis of old and new, this most profound criticism of cognition and metaphysics is reached in the fifth volume of his life-work, *Le thomisme devant la philosophie critique* which was published in 1926. This work enters into Kant's demands and takes up in a decisive way the problem as it developed in continual progress from the Renaissance and Descartes after medieval philosophy. Maréchal's great merit lies in this, that he acknowledges without bias the progress of the more profound and wider bearing of the question. A theory of cognition, in the literal meaning of the word, as an independent science, was unknown to the Greek and medieval philosophers. Their strong point

metaphysics. In modern times, however, metaphysics has been put more and more into the background and position taken up by the theory of cognition, until the time of Kant when the object of philosophy was freed from being to the creative *doing* of the transcendental, superindividual subject. Philosophy took its place from the universal human consciousness and its spontaneous functions.

Maréchal, therefore, states the fundamental idea of the *value of Pure Reason* clearly and concisely. Kant introduces his theory of cognition through the two forms of intuitions of space and time; in these, the unformed materials of the outer world as taken up by the receptive faculties of the senses are put in spatial and temporal order. Furthermore, he introduces twelve spontaneous forms of cognition, the categories of the intellect, by means of which the unformed sensations are united or molded into uniform intuitions called phenomena or conceptual objects. These *aprioristic* modes of the sensitive and the intellectual faculty are lastly combined by the synthetic function of apperception, that is, by the stable, permanent unity which is not the metaphysical Ego as the expression of metaphysical reality, but as a spontaneous logical function, a purely functional unity of all scientific activity. Thus far the *quaestio facti*, to use the words of Kant. Then follows the *quaestio juris*, the central question in the theory of cognition: What is the objective value of cognitive activities, what is the nature of the objects which determine all human cognition? Kant answers this question, as we know, by means of the "transcendental deduction." The principle of his answer which, it is interesting to note conditioned the Copernican revolution in philosophy, is formulated as follows: Either the objects make cognition possible, that is, either the things themselves are a norm-giving measure of the logical forms, as was held till then, or, on the contrary, the logical forms, the *aprioristic*, creative syntheses of consciousness, make objects possible. In the first case, the universality and necessity of cognition are rendered inexplicable. For all objects are individual and contingent, and universality and necessity cannot, then, be founded on them. This is one of Kant's fundamental suppositions of his philosophy. Truth he was convinced throughout his life as of a *principium per se notum*. It is the main thesis he took over from rationalism which he wished to overcome.

In the second case, however, if the objects are determined by the *aprioristic* subject and are creations of his subjective synthesis, human cognition is limited to phenomena. What is behind these, the noumena, is completely withdrawn from our theoretical cognition.

It now becomes the object of Practical Reason, the object of whose existence is warranted and postulated by its necessary relation to the Categorical Imperative, to the "Thou must" of the ethical, intelligible order. To be consistent with his empiristic theory of intellectual cognition, Kant had to make this phenomenal limitation of cognition. Like Hume and the empiricists, though he

aimed at surpassing them—which in some respects he actually did—and to whom he was indebted, he clung all his life to the prejudice that all concepts, all activity of the intellect, is limited to the "working up" of the material received through the senses into the more complete analysis and combination of the data of the senses and on the same plane as the sensitive phenomena. The intellect, for him, does not perceive in the objects of the senses being, essence, and relations; neither can it work these out through intuitive and discursive abstraction.

I have shown in *Ascents to Metaphysics*, that the more recent philosophy has not a well-constructed and healthy metaphysics. There is wanting that totality of acts necessary to build up a scientific theory of existent being.

Maréchal then sets forth what Scholasticism, especially St. Thomas, says regarding the question at issue. He knows very well, of course, that St. Thomas never put the question of the immanent or transcendental value of human cognition in the concise manner of Kant. The view of St. Thomas is from its very beginning realistic, or, to use Kant's words, dogmatic. His metaphysics is founded on a certain, definite judgment of the value of human cognition, which, however, is never expressed coherently and systematically. But St. Thomas does give principles of reality and cognition. Here and there he has sentences on criticism, psychology, and metaphysics of cognition, which, if they are put together into a system, applied to their final, logical consequences, and carried through in a creative way, enter into all the essential problems of Kant. Thus he answers with a definite "Yes" Kant's question: Is metaphysics possible, that is, is the cognition of transcendental, especially immaterial realities, possible?

From this question, fundamental and central not only to modern philosophy but to philosophy in general, we see the great speculative and critical importance of Maréchal. He takes up the modern questions, acknowledges what is true in them, shows fundamental errors, returns to the principles and great truths of Scholastic antiquity, follows them through to their natural conclusions, adds what is good in the theories of modern philosophers, and finally gives a solution of modern problems in the light of Christian philosophy.

Kant first answers the *quaestio facti* by showing the whole *Apriori* of the intellect through which science is constituted in its formal aspect. Maréchal does likewise from the Thomistic point of view. In particular, he does not say anything new, nor does he want to do so. His merit lies in the synthesis, namely, in the total construction of the single, dispersed elements in St. Thomas' system of the *Apriori* of sensitive and intellectual functions, which must be considered in forming the conceptual object.

To explain this synthesis more clearly, we may be allowed to repeat what is already known to the reader. The problem in question is the so-called "theory of abstraction": Things of experience impress the outer senses. The phantasm is formed in one of the senses through

this impression. The *intellectus agens* works out in a creative manner from this sensitive image the intellectual, generic species, by whose help the *intellectus possibilis* produces in itself a spiritual image of the object. Scholasticism emphasizes, as Kant did, the influence of the outer object, the receptivity of the senses and the spontaneity of the intellect, with this one exception: there is in the Scholastic system a much closer relation between the intellect and the senses. The intellect, in particular, has not the sole function of connecting the phantasms and analysing them further; it is, at the same time, the faculty of higher abstraction, of the *intus legere* of reality, essence, necessity, and universality in the sensitive phantasms. It rises to the intuition of the noumenal. Kant, proceeding from experience, denies this.

Thus far the *quaestio facti*. The result of the analyses made hitherto places Maréchal in no better position than Kant to answer the critical, fundamental question definitely: What is the objective value of human cognition? The intellectual image, although received in causal dependence from the transcendent object, is purely static, fully immanent to consciousness, and does not yet, intentionally, indicate the transcendency of the object. Thus, the most important question arises: How does consciousness "get hold" of the transcendency of the object; how is the intellectual image joined intentionally to, and found dependent upon, the outer object; how does it seize this something which, in its being, is alien to cognition?

To prove that our cognition is really determined by transcendent objects and not, as Kant says, that it remains in the phenomena of consciousness of the thinking subject, Maréchal proceeds with Scholasticism from a fact, just as Kant had proceeded from the fact of natural sciences. In this point, Maréchal's view differs from Kant's who, from the outset, had doubted the possibility of reaching positively immaterial objects. Maréchal calls this way of proceeding *critique métaphysique de l'objet*. Now, in order to follow his adversary into his own field, he places in its stead the *critique transcendentale de l'objet*. He makes Kant's view, the view of phenomenalism, his own: The objects or concepts, the statements of mathematics and natural sciences which are derived from these concepts, have value only in experience, only for the phenomena, only within the thinking subject. Even then—this is Maréchal's strict, logical consequence—this phenomenalism implicitly and virtually acknowledges something transcendent, something non-phenomenal, something noumenal—an absolute; and with this it affirms the principle of contradiction, thus including a transcendent reality.

Accordingly, Maréchal says that the phenomenal has a meaning only if the noumenal is behind it, because the relative is measured by the absolute. In this way the two great dialecticians, Plato and Aristotle, had put their argument against the subjectivism and relativism of the sophists.

But the *proprium*, the novelty of Maréchal's theory of

cognition does not lie so much in his *critique transcendentale de l'objet* as in his *critique métaphysique de l'objet*. Here he connects Scholastic motives with those of modern philosophy. It is his much-spoken of "dynamism of cognition." He himself says that he does not find the total unity and form of this theory in St. Thomas. But he founds his theory on the central and profound ideas of Aquinas, such as the *appetitus innatus* of the intellect in *omne bonum*, which constitutes its formal object, and consequently, its proper *bonum* and *appetibile*; secondly on the fundamental thesis, according to which God alone verifies in himself *omne verum et bonum*; and lastly, on the doctrine of St. Thomas that every end toward which the *appetitus innatus* tends supposes a being, a noumenon in which it subsists.

Maréchal expands these ideas of Scholasticism by adding important points of recent philosophy, as of Fichte and chiefly of Blondel and other French representatives of modern philosophers of life, who emphasize the dynamic, teleologic, creative element in the inner human activity.

The *quaestio facti* had regarded the intellectual image as purely static, strictly isolated. The *quaestio juris* proceeds in quite a different way. It intends to show how and why, that is, by what mental process the intellectual image really represents the transcendent object.

The image, hitherto considered as isolated, is inherent *de facto* in a substantial, unified, immaterial subject, namely the intellect or the permanent soul. Now, the image, in this great vital connection, is thrown out of its static state and carried into the dynamics of the mental stream. Only now does its whole, deep meaning appear. Every single cognition, therefore, is only an expression of a moment of the tendency (that is, the *appetitus innatus*) of the intellect to comprehend fully *omne verum* as its proper formal object and *bonum proprium*. That *species*, then, is a step of the intellect on the way to seize the whole truth. Through every single cognition the intellect approaches this ideal; in it the *appetitus innatus* has become the *appetitus elicited*.

Maréchal goes still further. With St. Thomas and Kant he says that every end tended to with natural necessity, constitutes a noumenon, not only a phenomenon. These two links show with evidence that the dynamism of cognition, namely that image which is borne by the total stream of cognition, now gets hold of a transcendent, noumenal object by which it is caused since it partakes in the dignity and being of the end.

Thus Maréchal has shown how human cognition reaches reality, how metaphysics is possible. *Le point de départ de la métaphysique* has been shown to lie in the *Apriori* of human activity.

The climax and crown of the dynamism of cognition is God as the *prima et universalis veritas subsistens*. Here Maréchal is weaving into his theory some ideas of St. Augustine's profound theology. Our intellect, he says, tends to *omne verum*, to the noumenal truth. But where

the ontological place of all truth if not in God, in the final Logos? Objectively, every true cognition tends finally to God. It would be an injustice to Maréchal to reject Ontologism in his system: God is in no way the unknown object of human cognition, nor is God known in the judgments which do not explicitly have Him as object. This is what Maréchal means to say: "Analytically the act of cognition, I shall finally find God as

the realization and subsistence of *omne verum* towards which every single act of cognition really moves in order to seize it and toward which the *appetitus innatus* carries it like a vital stream, to possess the *summum bonum*."

Thus we see that this dynamic cognition lays open, in a profound and lucid way, the last sources of the metaphysics of cognition no less than the cognition of metaphysics.

Final Causes in the System of Spinoza

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In order to follow the geometrical method entirely, Spinoza had to make tremendous sacrifices. He had to pass over as non-existent a number of prominent philosophical problems which, had he examined them at least cursorily, would have greatly enriched his thought, widened his outlook, and given him more conquering force, elegance, and flexibility, in a word, a greater fullness. Among these "sacrifices" which have so impoverished and distorted his system, we notice above all the rejection of final causes.

Why was Spinoza never willing to take the pains carefully to examine living organs and their manner of acting—things which have ever excited the admiration of the greatest intellects? "It would be rather unreasonable," Aristotle had said, "to go into ecstasies over imitations of nature, admiring the works of painting and architecture, and cease to enjoy natural beauty. . . . Everything in nature full of wonders."¹ In our own times such men as Paul Gauguin, the Fabres, the Drieschs, and many others voice the same idea. An organism for them is a real masterpiece of art, and as such is an idea, an *intention*, incarnate. And the functioning of its parts, so wonderfully coordinated and harmonized, is comparable only to the work of an artist who, with consummate ability, arranges the means toward a view of an end. It is impossible to explain anything without taking *final causes* into consideration.

Why then did Spinoza systematically avoid seeing in natural beings anything but "lines, surfaces, mathematical figures,"² and in their activity mere resultants of purely mechanical causes? Why did he exclude final causes, even before making any inquiry into them?³

The answer is easy. Geometrical method simply ignores final causality. It knows only logical causality, that is to say, the succession of understandable reasons. Certainly it is not by following some purpose or end that the single causes a number of properties to spring from its essence for the mathematician to study. Nor is it in virtue of a preconceived end that it lays down for his attention series of assertions. And yet Spinoza can exclaim: "The human race would never have known truth, had mathe-

matics, occupied not with ends but with essences and properties, not shown men another norm of truth."⁴ That is the ultimate reason why Spinoza rejected final causes in his system of metaphysics. Having decided to build *more geometrico*, he had to discard final causes as useless material. In other words, final causes have simply been sacrificed to the idol of Geometry.

Spinoza, nevertheless, realized perfectly well that it was not enough to repudiate final causes; he also had to show how the living organism and its activity could be understood without having recourse to such causality. With this in mind, he first attacked works of art, which those who defend final causes like to compare to works of nature.

One goes into ecstasy over works of art. True, but these are sometimes only "*stupidités*!"⁵ It is pretended that in art the idea of Reason is found incarnate. What a mistake! Are these works merely the creations of Reason? By no means; they are simply the productions of the Imagination. Further, they teach us nothing; not originating in Reason, they are not directed to it. Their only end is to make the same images, the same passions that hold the artist's soul in bondage at the moment of their creation, live again in other men. It is plain, then, why the arts are generally bad; they fill the soul with feelings of pity, fear, anger, and other like emotions; they thrust us again and again into sadness, the supreme vice of mankind, which narrows our being and perfection. Doubtless at times they can be good—when they portray joyful scenes. Then they raise our spirits, increase our joy, the supreme virtue of mankind, and thus help us to reach true moral progress.⁶ But after all, be they good or bad, works of art have nothing for Reason to perceive in them.

Finally, is beauty itself, in whose name we boast of so many works of art, truly an objective reality accepted by Reason? The "ignorant" believe so, but only because they mistake Imagination for Reason.⁷ In fact, beauty is nothing but a figment of the Imagination. To be convinced, look at the most beautiful hand under the microscope; it appears hideous. But

if our eyes were larger or smaller, or our temperament otherwise than it is, what now seems beautiful would be ugly, and what now seems ugly would be beautiful. . . . Things considered in themselves . . . are neither beautiful

nor ugly. . . .⁸ We call them beautiful when they have a good effect on our senses, and contribute thereby to our welfare (*valetudini conducunt*); in the opposite case we call them ugly.⁹

Having thus disparaged artistic works, Spinoza has no more difficulty explaining them mechanically, without the intervention of psychic intention or finality. One movement produces another; this one in turn another; and we see how works of art come about. He seems to have no place for psychic intention by means of which the soul guides the motion of the body.

This is the corollary of the geometrical method. And because it proceeds by logical deduction, it will never recognize a psychic act as the cause of a material effect. Never, to be sure, can a reality so incongruous as a psychic fact be deduced, by a logical operation, from a corporal reality.¹⁰

What we have just said of works of art may be applied as well to natural beings such as organisms. Their every action, in the material order, which evokes our admiration by its perfection or complexity, is explained by the mechanical make-up of the organism. "The act of striking, for example, if taken in its physical reality as when a man raises his arm, closes his hand, and lets his arm fall again, is merely an exercise of force which may be explained by the construction of the human body."¹¹ Indeed, are not organs of the human body, complex as they may be, real bodies themselves?¹² For every

body in motion or rest must have been determined by the motion or rest of another body, the latter by a third, and so on *ad infinitum*.¹³ The modes of each attribute have God for their cause, only inasmuch as He is considered under the attribute of which they are the modes, and not insofar as He is considered under another attribute.¹⁴

But those who hold final causes call attention to the admirable order which holds sway in the works of nature, and which seems inexplicable by the play of mechanical causes. "Another mistake," replies Spinoza. "For, what is order? It is a figment of the Imagination." Indeed

we call something well ordered when the objects which the senses represent to us are so disposed as to be easily gathered by the Imagination . . . and consequently easily reproduced by the memory. If on the contrary they are badly arranged, we call them confused.¹⁵

For it is evident "that things which we can easily imagine are by that very fact agreeable to us."¹⁶ And "that is why men prefer order to confusion";¹⁷ that is why they attribute to it a worth, an objective existence, when in reality it is merely "a relation to our Imagination,"¹⁸ a fiction.

Spinoza, however, was not the man to be deceived as to the import of his refutation of final causes. To all appearances it was too *a priori* and expressed in too general terms to satisfy the mind and free it completely from the "prejudice" of final causes. Then, too, wishing to anticipate his reader's objection, he adds that, although this is true, men will not wish to believe it, "so convinced are they that the body's state of motion and rest is controlled by the soul,"¹⁹ so certain are they that such complicated actions of the living organism cannot be the simple result-

ant of its structure. But have they ever determined what the body can do with mechanical laws alone? Have they ever delved thoroughly into its potentialities?²⁰

Carried away as he was by polemic ardor he did not realize that his attack upon final causes could very well be turned upon himself. Did he himself ever inquire into the mystery of natural forces? How then can he affirm confidently that they are enough to produce the effects in question? Did he conclusively show, for instance, how vital actions, even the most commonplace—vegetation, growth, generation, regeneration of a mutilated member—can be explained by mechanical causes alone? Again, has he adequately shown that the vital actions which tend to produce the organic structure (the seed sown in the ground from which will sprout forth the whole structure of the tree) are merely a resultant? Indeed not. He neither did nor could do it.

To return to what was said above. Final causes have been rejected without thorough investigation; they have been "sacrificed." From the moment that Spinoza declared his choice in favor of geometric method, the lot of final causes was irrevocably settled. As a consequence, he was led to reject free will, because in his eyes final causes and free will were intimately connected.²¹ In this, to our way of thinking, he was not entirely wrong; in fact, the classical arguments in favor of free will seem to imply finality.

This may be briefly explained. The following is the first classical argument: The will follows *intellectual cognition*. But intellectual cognition, because of its universality, grasps in the particular object which elicits our choice not only the agreeable aspect, but also the disagreeable (in the broad sense of the word), which makes us avoid it. The will, therefore, cannot grasp the good in view necessarily; it must remain indifferent. Otherwise there would be in human nature, because of its intellectual faculty, an incoherence, a contradiction between the spiritual faculties, a disorder such as is not found even in the animal kingdom. Thus the last foundation of this argument is no other than finality.

The argument may be presented in another guise, relying more upon the relation of act and potency, of moveable and movable—a relation which occurs between the good known by the intelligence on the one hand, and the will on the other. For the will to be fully determined to act by the good presented to it, the latter must equal its capacity. But finite good can never be equal to this capacity which is infinite, since it follows intellectual cognition, universal in its nature. Here again, as is evident, one relies upon the finality implied in relative and proportional notions of act and potency.

Let us go on to another classical argument. Natural judgments *judicia sensus communis* cannot be wrong. But the judgment by which free will is affirmed is a natural judgment (for it is constant and universal—at least in practice, or "morally"—and necessary for man if he is to live a life worthy of his reasonable nature). Here again

can be seen, the ultimate reason upon which this argument rests is finality.

Finally, let us indicate the argument taken from facts, such as deliberation, consultation, remorse or approval of conscience after the actual choice. This argument, too, implies finality. Indeed, without free will the facts just alleged would be absolutely meaningless and inexplicable; they would lack a sufficient reason. And why should all facts of nature be understood and explained and have sufficient reason? Because the finality which reigns in the world demands it. That is the last word in the argument.

In conclusion, Spinoza's assertion that final causes and free will are things intimately linked together was not altogether wrong. It is easy to understand why he rejected free will together with final causes. And the argument taken from consciousness, moreover, did not deserve mention, if we are to believe Spinoza, for the simple reason that it is an argument from "experience" which he had outlawed from his system once and for all. Experience was not in harmony with geometrical method because its contents cannot be mathematically deduced from any analytical principle. They are but the data with which we are confronted, which we find ready-made. These are only "historiettes"! Little difference does it make to Spinoza that free will is attested to by experience. He did not even deign to look into this testimony of experience in any detail.²²

In short, it is in virtue of the geometric method that final causes and free will were denied by Spinoza. They are simply "sacrificed" to the idol of Geometry!

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- ² *Ethica*, III, Preface, ed. by Gebhardt (Heidelberg, 1927), p. 138.
- ³ Cf. *Psychologia Metaphysica*, Bk. I (Gregorian Univ. Press, Rome, 1932), and *La psychophysique humaine d'après Aristote*, in *Collection historique des grands philosophes* (Felix Alcan, Paris, 1930).
- ⁴ *Eth.*, I, Appendix, p. 79.
- ⁵ For Spinoza Ariosto's poetry is nothing but "stupidités." A number of good authorities, among them Dunin-Borkowski, S. J., *Spinoza nach dreihundert Jahren*, 1932, p. 30, underline with great force the almost total lack of esthetic sentiments in Spinoza's works.
- ⁶ Perhaps this is why Spinoza liked to read comedies. Terence was his greatest delight.
- ⁷ *Eth.*, Appendix, pp. 81-82.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter 54 to H. Boxel, ed. by Gebhardt, p. 252.
- ⁹ *Eth.*, I, Appendix, p. 82.
- ¹⁰ Cf. *L'âme et le corps d'après Spinoza*, in *Collection historique des grands philosophes* (Felix Alcan, Paris), pp. 109-143.
- ¹¹ *Eth.*, IV, 59, p. 255.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, II, 10, pp. 99-102.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6, p. 89.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I, Appendix, p. 82.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Letter 32, p. 170.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 2, p. 142.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, I, Appendix, pp. 77-83.
- ²² We have developed the argument taken from "consciousness" in our lecture given to the International Congress of Philosophy at Prague. See "*La conscience de la liberté*" an extract, *Gregorianum*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1935, pp. 53-73.

A Linguistic Psychology

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IT IS the distinctive merit of Father Marcel Jousse, S. J., to have solved, according to the judgment of many, a mystery long perceived and closely connected with our most intimate and fundamental habits of every-day life: the profound mystery of language. Though the learned suit waives all claim to invention, popular acclaim and the approval of experts, however, along with the enthusiastic appraisal of a great part of the European University press, mark him as the inventor of a method of linguistic psychology, if only by reason of the new applications which he has made in the textual criticism of the Sacred Books of the Old and New Testaments.

It is possible that Father Jousse, professor of Anthropology and of Linguistics at the Sorbonne in Paris, though acquainted with the United States because of his visit here as captain of artillery and instructor of the American troops at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, in 1918, has not yet been properly introduced to our American readers. We shall endeavor, therefore, to summarize the main outlines of his psychological reflexions, hoping

to acquaint the readers of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN with the capital points of this new linguistic philosophy, thus to set in relief the majestic proportions of the ensemble. If our brief résumé, stripped of the technical apparatus which Father Jousse employs in his first book¹ seems to be somewhat an idealization, the fault is in our endeavor to compress within a few paragraphs what he has crowded into a closely packed volume. But happy the fault if it provokes in the reader the desire to study the work at first hand in the original.

The subject he treats is extremely arduous, and the reading of his *Style oral rythmique et mnémotechnique* is difficult. It is the work of a savant, abounding in long passages of Hebrew, Arab, Chinese, forming often a mosaic of references with strange terminology. The devotees of philology will find delight in such intricacies, but for those of us who belong to a more restricted category, a modest exposé will suffice.

Père Jousse studies the psychological reactions of the human composite to external stimuli, as revealed in gesture,

which is but the exteriorization of thought, be it bodily gesture, with its oral translation in articulate language, or written gesture, which is its graphic fixation in writing. Thus his book is divided into a logical trilogy: the manual style, the oral style, and the written style.

To explain the first, let us imagine the following incident. A lady opposite you in a street car, reading, let us say, *The Ladies' Home Journal*, is abruptly disturbed when a young man who has just entered, steps on her foot slightly protruding in the aisle. Grimaces, shuddering, stifled moanings from the lady! "One can never read in peace; and he doesn't even excuse his *gaucherie*." Then a redoubling of her mimic to let him know her resentment, or at least to draw a sympathetic nod of approval from the other occupants. A story without words! Not a word was uttered. But yet what a discourse; what hidden eloquence; what working of complex sentiments and of thoughts in the simple gesticulations of this scene enacted by the lady, by this young man, and by those who were witness to the incident!

And now the analysis. Seen from without, a human being is a bundle (*faisceau*) of energy which, once excited, reacts by the discharges of nerve waves. Each provocation sets his whole body in motion, following always certain natural laws. He is a living being who adapts himself to his environment, from which a steady flow of excitations register on his organism. At any moment, the most violent excitation monopolizes his sensibility, polarizing for its own advantage the available energy. These vital reactions, muscular or nerve discharges, are transmuted into external movements of the bodily organs and muscles, into a variety of gesticulations; thus the phrase: *Au commencement était le geste rythmique*.

Studied from the interior, this human reaction by *geste* is no longer merely vital adaptation—it is intellectual assimilation. As soon as I perceive the connection between my reactions and the object which provoked them, I am capable of reproducing as voluntary gesticulation what heretofore was merely spontaneous movement. What I experienced but sensibly at first now lives as a mental state; the *geste* is henceforth the substitute (*tenant lieu*) of the object. More than that: it is also the sign of the object; a sign, however, which is neither an audible cry nor a word, but the whole human comportment which undergoes, so to speak, the influence of some external object, to which it becomes vitally united. Through this union it reproduces the essential nature of this object by its own internal reaction, using this object to express to another person the impression received. Thus this sign, this *geste*, plays a double role: mediator, or means of communication, between the world and the soul, and between the different minds.

Thanks to Maine de Biran,² these views are familiar to French psychology, but it was left to the originality of Father Jousse to enlarge upon them in such a way as to connect the data of linguistics with those of ethnology,

by bridging the passage from the initial voluntary *geste* to the written or spoken sentence.

Man has a natural spontaneous tendency, almost instinctive, to reproduce by imitation (*à mimer*) his environment—a tendency so universal and appropriate to the human species that Aristotle seems to have made of it a specific difference of the human composite, when he asserts that man is the most imitative of all creatures.³ Of course, one must not frequent the salons of high society of artificially polished manners to study such original spontaneity. However, it remains: *difficile est naturam exuere*.

Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop.

It is among children who have not yet been subjected to the stifling social constraint, that the psychologist can study more satisfactorily this inclination to mimicry. We may say that their simple games are no more than perpetual *mimodrames* in which are rehearsed the scenes they have seen enacted by others. Father Jousse draws upon his contact with the various tribes of Indians in the United States to substantiate many of his contentions; for among these Indians this natural mimicry has not only, in many instances, never been contaminated, but has become more elaborate with the passing years. They have kept a medium of intercommunication of extreme finesse by virtue of its richness and variety which is mystifying for us. This complex *geste*, intuitive and logical mimicry, ingenious expression of reality assimilated by man responding by thought and action to his environment, our author styles *geste propositionnel*.

This stylistic *geste* has no better servants than the arms and hands, for it is by them that we grasp a thing or put it from us. No more supple instrument of mime can be found than the arms and the hands *pour représenter les mystères du monde ou pour danser les rondes de la vie*. Someone once said that man thinks because he has hands, and Father Jousse would add: "Yes, and it is these hands which beget the *geste*, which in turn engenders the thought."

In the second stage of thought expressions, the oral style, we note new phenomena. Though remaining psychologically predominant in the spontaneous ebullition of human nature, the instinctive tendency to mimic *gestually* the outside universe is not the only one, because, besides mimicking the attitudes and actions of other beings, man can imitate as well the sound which characterizes and differentiates each. Of course, this mimic of sound is infinitely less distinct, less expressive, than the mimic of the bodily actions: the plastic and sculptural copying, so to speak, of the being imitated along with his actions.

The spoken word is, like the manual *geste*, only a *geste*, a *geste* in words, or to be more exact, a gesticulation of the laryngo-buccal muscles. To use a figure, we may say that the vital reaction is the trunk from which spring the different sensible expressions of one same idea—*gestes* merely tactile, as for example, of the deaf and dumb; *gestes* mainly manual, as of the primitive man; and verbal *gestes*, common to the greater part of mankind. Of all

types of language, the equivalence is assured by this coincidence where they are undifferentiated. In fact, the spoken word far exceeds the language of spontaneous manual gesticulation. But exceptions there are, as Father Jousse well points out, as for instance, the five Indian tribes of America, who use almost exclusively the gesture language of the hands as a medium of communication.

Having established a theory for his phonetic experiments, Father Jousse investigates still farther their psychological and ethnical characteristics. By dint of repetition of this automatism, this almost mechanical movement, the muscles of the larynx and of the throat acquire an instinctive tendency to fall back upon a certain number of those privileged schemata which have been most frequently repeated. And experience proves that these fine word combinations are not very numerous. Thus, Father Jousse, the diction of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is only a particular application of a profound and universal psycho-physiological law. Just as rhythmic schemes follow instinctively the spontaneous tendencies of the organism, they must proceed in the direction of these tendencies, thus facilitating in a singular manner the work of the memory. Hence their nature, not poetic but practical, among the peoples who knew no written language. Hence also the astonishing facility of improvisation, of memory, and of recitation which may be met with among the indigenous tribes of Syria, for example, to employ this oral style.

It would seem that these recitations are so carefully rhymed only to be communicated the more exactly from lip to lip, from one generation to another, until the day when the *scriptor* would commit to writing on stone or parchment rolls what was left of these improvised rhythmic schemes from years or even centuries before. Thus the birth of books, unfaithful supports of the memory, witnesses of a forgetful mind, as Father Jousse proposes to express it. The presence of books soon necessitates a grammar which, separating imagination and reality, inevitably destroys our spontaneity. And he concludes his eloquent tirade thus:

Entre ses feuillets, enfin, s'étiolera notre mémoire. . . . Bientôt les doux chants de la "presse vivante" seront couverts par les grincements rauques de la "presse mécanique," et le style écrit aura banni jusqu'au souvenir du style oral.

As regards writing or written *geste*, as he would call it, Father Jousse describes a similar evolution to the two preceding stages already described. To believe that man first drew objects of nature, etc., just as he saw them, would be to judge our ancestors after our own habits. Original hieroglyphics are not designs or drawings of an object as it is in itself, but a copy of the *geste* of this object, the substitute in man for the object itself, not an *ogramme*, but a *mimogramme*; the idea being in the beginning not divorced from the *geste* which constructed it. Then, in proportion as the oral *geste* replaces the manual *geste*, the mimogram becomes the sign of sound

and no longer that of the *geste*. Since the day that its origin was forgotten, writing appeared with the traits and signs arbitrarily chosen to represent these sounds. Ever since, it has lived on as a thing apart. The child who accepts from its parents these words, already made, believes their meaning arbitrarily fixed. As he advances in age, he learns to discern the influences which went into their making, and soon he discovers, inscribed in his language, the whole history of his race. Every day in our high schools and colleges our students, thumbing their Webster, have this same experience of etymological study.

In short, from these human vital reactions, common to all men, as from a sort of indifferent matter, have sprung into being the various languages as we know them today. In explaining the mechanism of the nerve waves from which emerge our spoken words, Father Jousse, by tracing them down to the original *geste*, revives in us the consciousness of their value. And *pari passu* with the study of the advance of humanity, we come to discover better, inscribed in language, the history of man's consciousness.

Finally, the application of this new theory to the verbal style of the Bible is most interesting. Here, as always, it is with the same rigorously objective method, with the same regard for facts whatever they may be, that the founder of this new linguistic psychology proceeds: scientific objectivity so unimpeachable that it has won for him, with astonishing unanimity, the support of the gravest and most prudent exegetes at Rome and elsewhere. One of the most learned members of the Biblical Commission has dedicated a recent work to him in these words: *Au R. P. Jousse qui par une voie nouvelle confirme les vérités anciennes*. The new way alluded to is, of course, the application of the laws of the oral style to the old biblical texts considered in their psycho-ethnic setting.

A host of substantiating and converging facts prove that the biblical setting of the Old and the New Testaments was one of the oral style. Henceforth, advocated Father Jousse, the traditional biblical texts must be studied from a point of view which harmonizes with this style, and not exclusively by our present methods of hypercritical graphic. The first research to make will be that of the rhythmic schemes into which the composers of Israel have cast, so to speak, probably without knowing it, all their Hebraic improvisations. Add to this a list of parallel stereotyped phrases (as heaven-earth, soul-spirit, Jacob-Israel, etc.) which not only emphasize the balancing by a sort of pre-felt automatism, but even direct from within the profound logic. Moreover, it will appear most unmistakably that the Hebrew compositions have been meticulously arranged to be learned by heart, thus to be guarded intact from generation to generation.

More interesting still is the study of the history of the transition, the handing-down, of the biblical recitations to our own day through the medium of the oral style. The original style might have been transposed or translated in the oral style of another language, as for instance, when the Israelites returned from their Babylonian cap-

tivity speaking another language, Aramaic. The traditional biblical narratives could no longer be understood in the original Hebrew; therefore, they had recourse to the Targums, oral transfers, if you wish, in Aramaic, of the old Hebrew rhythmic schemes. Later still, when the communities of Jews began to commingle with the Greek-speaking world at Alexandria, the Aramaic Targums were after some time no longer understood. Hence the necessity of elaborating, there also, some oral Greek Targums transmuted from memory. Psychologically speaking, these new Greek Targums from the original Hebrew have a tendency to undergo *la vivante interférence* of the preceding Aramaic Targums, previously memorized by the interpreters. Also, it is Aramaic which is transferred, in place of Hebrew, with the result that the Greek translations were almost, frequently absolutely, inexplicable, unless, of course, the *interférent* linguistic mechanism be taken into account.

In a question so thoroughly psychological as is that which Father Jousse treats, philosophy will necessarily have a word to say, if only in so far as it touches the problem of the origin and acquisition of ideas, of their communication to others as the expression of an idea or as the external rendering of an internal sensation. For how without philosophy and metaphysics can we organize matter wherein is incarnated human thought! Though Father Jousse speaks not as a philosopher *ex professo*, his system clarifies, or at least gives a new vocabulary for, the problem of knowledge. Where we write *species*, we might now insert "mimic"; and the *phantasma* of Aristotle is no longer image but *geste*. The phantasm is the spontaneous *geste* because it is the product, more or less elaborate, which sensibility presents to the intellectual activity of the mind. The *species* is no more than the *geste* of the will, or better, a voluntary *geste*, because the conformity can be no more than an activated conformity: a position forced upon her. St. Thomas may possibly be interpreted in this sense when he says:

... *sed loco horum omnium* (various instincts), *homo habet naturaliter rationem et manus, quae sunt organa organorum, quia per ea homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum modorum et ad infinitos effectus.*

Following Father Jousse's terminology we might say "Ratio and manus form together the unity of the discursive intellect with our motor organs, with unity effected, of course, in the *geste*, especially manual *geste* from which in turn is born that infinite diversity of living instruments of thoughts, our spoken words. The psychology of *geste* even more than that of the mere image, seems to harmonize with the Thomistic theory of knowledge, for it shows as realized in every judgment, in every word uttered, the union and the distinction of soul and body, thus dissipating many problems of Cartesian rationalism; for the *geste*, if analyzed fully, is the *verbum mentis*, a double-faced *verbum*, one of which is turned toward the mind, the other toward the universe—a *verbum* which is both the echo and the clarion call, at the same time, of the *Verbum*, Eternal and Incarnate, *Geste* of Divine Love for mankind.

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Le point de départ de la métaphysique. (Charles Beyaert, Bruges, 1923) Cahier V, p. 175:
Ratio et manus: c'est-à-dire l'unité de l'intelligence discursive et des organes moteurs, moyennant la relation de l'universel au phantasme "secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem."

Book Reviews

TRAGISCHE EXISTENZ

By Alfred Delp, S. J.

Herder and Co., St. Louis, 1935, \$.80

Modern philosophy, in contradistinction to the Grecian and Scholastic "mean," is a philosophy of extremes. Luther cut man off from his secure anchor in objective religion, Kant separated him from objective reality, and the inevitable results of this "freedom" was religious, moral, and philosophical chaos. The evolution of this principle in historical Europe is the background which Fr. Alfred Delp places around his exposition of Existential Philosophy as it is developed in the system of Martin Heidegger. In the apparently contradictory and confused move-

ments of post-Kantian thought, Fr. Delp finds one unifying principle: the attempt to find order in chaos, to find salvation amid ruin. This attempt first led to one, and then to the opposite extreme of thought; and the "tragedy of life" finds actualization in this, that every attempt toward salvation brought greater woe. In this pendulum-like shifting of thought, Existential Philosophy sprang forth as the reaction to idealism and rationalism. Existential Philosophy is a philosophy of *life*; it belongs to those systems of thought which minimize the supremacy of reason. It emphasizes the need for action; the need to do things. But "things" the real world—in Heidegger's view, exist only in so far as they can be used by men. Thus

he deprives them of all real existence. When he comes to explain man, he states that his deepest meaning is to be found in this: man comes from nothing and disappears into nothing and for the present he must busy himself with "things." He baldly stated, it appears that although he started with an empirical realism, he ended in a kind of idealism: all things are relative to man. Many other points are brought out: Heidegger's concept of time, space, existence, man and his relation to the world, his "fear," his "care," his "salvation."

Delp's view includes not only the errors of Heidegger's but a fine appraisal of its value. And he considers its chief worth to lie in this, that it recognizes the need of starting with the real. This is a blow struck against idealism. Again, Heidegger's philosophy seeks to view the real in its totality; another stroke, that hits not only idealism, but many more one-sided narrow systems of today. Heidegger's system sets before us his nothingness; and Nietzsche's Superman staggers under its blow. It begins with life, not with 'categories' or mental essences. But in spite of its good qualities, it cannot lead men; Fr. Delp clearly shows that its great failure is that it neglects either that which is above and beyond man.

Small as this book is, it is packed with thought. The author goes deeply into the foundations of Existential Philosophy, gives a careful and accurate account of its history, principles, meaning and implications, and its value. Moreover, it is written in pleasing and polished German. A book at once scholarly, literary, accurate, clear and interesting, is a welcome addition to the efforts of those who are striving for points of contact between Scholasticism and modern philosophy.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ

MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY

from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist

George H. Mead

The University of Chicago Press, 1935, \$5.00

The Introduction to this book, which perhaps is the clearest of it, tells us that Mead belongs to "an old tradition—the tradition of Aristotle. . . ." It is true in one respect, but in that respect alone. Aristotle had the misfortune of being read by students in his class. As all the world knows, many of the works of Aristotle are what his students, after listening and crawling with what efficiency they could, said he said. This is the point in which Mead and Aristotle are alike, for Mead's philosophy is reconstructed from the notes—stenographic record, often read by his students. It is perhaps a misfortune for him. For the book makes extraordinarily hard reading, it is foggy, fuzzy, obscure. And the diction often tumbles into a great mass of words which closely resemble jargon.

The Introduction, which is also an attempt at interpreting Mead to us, is the clearest part of the book, perhaps because it is the briefest. Mead's philosophy—we are told there in his own words—opposes "the otherworldliness of the reason of ancient philosophy, the otherworldliness of soul . . . of the Christian doctrine, the otherworldliness of the mind . . . of the dualisms." He is a "social behaviorist."

He comes to his work—and works—in a manner which mortally embarrasses his editors. He is not a scientist, "Mead has little or nothing to the corpus of the facts of the social sciences . . . the observations to which Mead appeals are for the most part open to anyone—they involve no special scientific technique." But then it is happily discovered that "in insight into the nature of minds and selves and society" there is room for what may be called science.

His problem is the age-old one, "the problem of how man, a rational animal, arose." His solution of the problem is simple. His theory boils down to this that a moral whole (society) vivifies the pre-existing parts (the individuals) with new life and new attributes. But the moral whole (society)

creates intelligence in the pre-existing parts (the individuals) by the separate and individual activity of the pre-existing parts. "There could not be individual consciousness except in a social group."

One is tempted to dismiss such an hypothesis ("Indeed any psychological or philosophical treatment of human nature involves the assumption that the human individual belongs to an organized social community, and derives his human nature from his social interactions and relations with that community as a whole and with the other individual members of it" [Italics ours]) as not worthy of serious consideration. For it not only appeals to a "special creation"—which the author's evolutionary views forbid him to hold—but it is the even more homely "pulling one's self up by one's own bootstraps."

Mead indeed adverts to all the factors out of which a sane theory of man could come. He treats of universals superficially well, descriptively very well—but lacks the power of interpreting his findings. He is aware of the difficulty purpose—teleology—makes for his type of philosopher but he dismisses the matter, "There is no necessity of bringing in an end towards which all creation moves." He shows a scorn for nominalism—and himself is a splendid representative of the species. He does not like dualism—so he creates a monism with two constitutive parts.

With his power of observation, which appears in these papers sometimes whimsically, as when he gives a pen picture of the politician and his "have a cigar" manner before elections, he might have come to a better conclusion had he had some idea of the value and power of metaphysics and its essential part in all thinking. But he is actually helpless in interpreting the observations he makes. He fails so lamentably in seeing how the brush that tars the baby must be "tardier" than the baby—*propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud majus*.

As to the reason for the book—that is wholly lovely, just as loyalty is lovely. Mead is dead. His students and his friends would not have him flicker out without some reminder of his—to them—greatness and charm. They have gotten him canonized by Dewey, who pontifically proclaims him "a seminal thinker." They can worship safely in the security that that "canonization" gives them. But I am afraid they worship sadly and with a sort of desperate but unfounded hope. For, since Mead is dead, and since Chicago University under the leadership of President Hutchins is showing a decided tendency to veer to righter paths and clearer thinking in matters philosophical, there is not too much chance that Mead will create a vogue from out his grave. I think, then, that except for the historian of philosophy—who must be interested in every oddity and every deviation of the human mind that pretends to be a system—the book will have little interest. And it is not significant.

R. B. MORRISON

THE SCEPTICAL APPROACH TO RELIGION

Paul Elmer More

Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1934, \$2.00

In *The Sceptical Approach to Religion* Paul Elmer More wrestles with a problem which is created for him by what he calls the moral responsibility and the intellectual impotence of man. Moral responsibility, he believes, makes religion a necessity; but since we are intellectually impotent, since, for example, we are unable, as he contends, to reason to the existence of God, what shall be our approach to religion? Faith, he argues, faith. Believe that God exists even though our intellectual impotence precludes the possibility of proving that He exists. Believe because you wish to believe, because you must believe. And if you hesitate to accept such a belief, fear not; for thus did Socrates believe, and Plato, and the ancient Hebrews; in fact, the history of religion proves that all true religion has begun with just

such a belief. But do you still hesitate, fearing lest your willed belief may turn out a cruel joke, fearing lest you may eventually discover that you have been deluded? Still, fear not; for you need but *hope* that your belief is not in vain.

Thus far the theory of religion as expounded by Paul Elmer More in *The Sceptical Approach to Religion*. You may be able to accept his theory—if only you can hope. I could not. An emotional hope in an irrational faith? That is asking a little too much.

Against this book I aim three main criticisms: first, Mr. More's approach to religion is based on an assumption which he has not proved and cannot prove; secondly, his interpretation of Plato, essential to the appeal of his argument, is open to serious objection; and, thirdly, his philosophy is not coherent; it is apparently self-contradictory.

And what is the initial assumption? If you read "Rationalism and Faith," the first chapter of this book, you will find that Mr. More (for what cause he does not state) maintains that the man who tries to reason, or even believes that he can reason from or beyond phenomena is less rational, less a philosopher, than the man who naïvely suspends his judgment when confronted with the problem of the one and the many in the realm of knowledge. In fact, he goes farther; for he would maintain that the human intellect cannot pierce beyond phenomena or reason from phenomena to the things beyond. If you can swallow that assumption, even without the seasoning of a slight proof, you may think this book palatable.

Of Mr. More's interpretation of Plato little need be said. It will be sufficient to remark that Plato's dialogues are open to quite another epistemological interpretation, that is, to an interpretation that Plato postulated the Ideas in order to find a sufficient, adequate, and complete cause for the ideas which he knew he had of justice, holiness, and virtue, as well as of man, of horse, and of house. But that interpretation Mr. More cannot accept—if he is to be the kind of Platonist who could be at the same time a Paul Elmer More sceptic.

Furthermore, and this is my third criticism, it is difficult to understand how Mr. More can be a Platonist at all and still contend, in speaking of the principle of causality, that "all we get from observation, as Hume demonstrated finally, is a succession of unconnected events." Can a Platonist be a Humian? Can anyone accept Plato's affirmation of a distinction between thought and sensation, and at the same time subscribe to that rejection of the principle of causality which is based on a denial of a distinction between thought and sensation? Is Mr. More's philosophy so eclectic as to be self-contradictory?

RICHARD T. DETERS

THE EARLY PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE

Matthew Thompson McClure

D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1935, \$2.25

This volume adds to the Century Philosophy Series a work interpreting the origin of speculative thought in ancient Greece, with English translations of the fragmentary source materials. It begins with a historical introduction, which contains some good chapters on the earliest beliefs about the human soul and about the beginning of the world. After thus placing in their proper setting the original contributions of the first known individuals in the field of philosophy, Mr. McClure devotes a chapter to the analysis of the tenets of each of the pre-Socratic philosophers from Thales to Leucippus and Democritus. For some reason, however, he omits Zeno of Elea.

The composition of the work suggests that it is an elaboration of materials originally gathered from many sources for use as classroom lectures. The consequent orderly treatment of the matter, as well as the concise summarizations of problems and their conclusions which occur throughout, will undoubtedly give to the general student of this period of the history of philosophy all that he requires.

On the other hand, the present work will probably not be of very great value to the more informed scholar or to the deep investigator into the remains of the writings of these early philosophers, for it appears to contain little that is new, if not a great deal with which to disagree. Neither does it pretend such completeness as to offer a history or a detailed criticism of the fragments or of the testimony of the doxographical writers. In short, scholars cannot consider it to have replaced Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* as the standard English work for text and interpretations of the pre-Socratic schools of thought.

EDWARD A. THRO

ON THE GOVERNANCE OF RULERS

By St. Thomas Aquinas

Translated from the Latin by Gerald B. Phelan, Ph. D.
St. Michael's College, Toronto, Canada, 1935, \$7.50

During these world-wide political crises this translation is quite timely. The purpose of the book is to expound the nature and origin of government and the duties of a ruler according to the authority of Holy Writ, the doctrine of the philosophers, and the lessons of history; and St. Thomas has fulfilled his purpose in his customarily lucid, balanced, and objective manner.

The present volume contains a preface and a translation of the authenticated parts of the text: Bk. I, and Bk. II, Chap. 1-4. In the preface the translator presents a scholarly discussion of the title of the original, its authenticity, date of composition, content, and text. In the body of the work the topics dealt with may be grouped under these headings: the necessity of government, the merits and demerits of different forms of government, the reasons and motives for which rulers govern, the nature of rulership and general duties of rulers (Bk. I), and the duties of rulers in particular (Bk. II, Chap. 1-4).

A frequent criticism of books expounding Scholastic doctrine in English is that they are awkwardly written and smack strongly of the text-book that they make unpleasant reading. Here, however, the Latin terminology and thought sequence are faithfully rendered without distortion of the native genius either in vocabulary or syntax. It is a splendid step forward toward a comprehensive and attractive presentation of the *philosophia perennis* to American readers.

W. L. ROSSNER

GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

Book I: "Of the Understanding"

Edited by Philip Wheelright

Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York
1935, \$1.25

ARISTOTLE FROM NATURAL SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Translated and Edited by Philip Wheelright

Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York
1935, \$1.00

The study of philosophy in most non-scholastic circles has degenerated into an incidental study of the history of philosophy. Like the abandoned theories of the physical sciences, the various philosophic systems are examined as of no present-day value but as marking the evolution of a peculiar mental bias. Somehow or other the old confusion of progress and change has found place even here. Any attempt to return to the former study of philosophy as an objective quest for truth with a view to establishing a firm basis for a personal explanation of life, therefore, can be looked upon only with favor. The study of outstanding philosophers through their own personal work and not through commentaries is, we believe, a step in this direction. Most of them from Plato to Leibnitz wrestled with the questions that have always perplexed mankind, although the answers often

gh escaped them. Nevertheless to recognize that there is blem is the beginning of true philosophy.

ne place of Berkeley and Hume, however, among the out- ing philosophers is far in the background. Both of them got essly mixed up with the tools of philosophy and never to grips with philosophy itself. The value of their work philosophic discipline is, to say the least, dubious. Mr. elwright has laid too much emphasis on their importance he revolt against the 'caked prejudices' of traditional ration- ." Neither of them bridged the gap that Descartes had between the mind and the object; in fact neither of them the question squarely. Both of them showed an unpar- able ignorance of the history of philosophy. To deny mat- with Berkeley is certainly to destroy materialism, but it is science. To deny the whole problem with Hume is to effectively the issue, but it is worse philosophy.

r. Wheelwright has prefaced his edition of Berkeley with ic criticism of the latter's idealism. His analysis and criti- of Hume, however, are decidedly inferior. This is the to be regretted as Hume's scepticism has greater superficial al for the student of this age. Hume's empiricism stops e the real problems of philosophy begin. True enough, icism could never teach him the principle of causality. But could have asked a more fundamental question: "Is the iple of causality subject to empiricism?" Hume's empiric iple "is the basis of the great critical movements in modern sophy" only because his successors are wholly illogical. If wed out logically it would have bound all subsequent sophy and science hand and foot.

he philosophy of Aristotle is on an altogether loftier plane. y phase of philosophy was touched upon and carried to a state of perfection by his genius. In marked contrast to piecemeal criticism of Berkeley and Hume is the universal cter of his work. The selections, taken from the *Natural ce*, *Psychology*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, indicate the wide of Aristotle's thought and serve as an excellent introduc- to his great synthesis. Nothing can show better the critical logical nature of his reasoning than a study of the texts selves. They are an effective antidote to any preconceived ns of the unscientific method of his work. Mr. Wheel- nt's translations are done in clear English, and his introduc- includes an able summary of the Peripatetic philosophy.

istotle deserves a central place in the teaching of the schools. he best tradition of Hume, inquiry into ultimate causes is

too often quashed. Yet it is impossible to put any unity and stability into the constantly changing modern view of life with- out returning to a basic philosophy. Aristotle not only offers a point of departure for such a philosophy but indicates the lines along which it can be constructed. We hope that these trans- lations will give impetus to a renewed interest in his work.

It is to be regretted that the editor of the volume on Aristotle has omitted mention of St. Thomas in his bibliography.

JOHN A. MCGRAIL

PROCEEDINGS: THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, 1934

The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.,
1934, \$1.50

The proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Asso- ciation are commendable no less for the intrinsic worth of the contributions than for the enthusiasm displayed and the promise of future achievement. Last year the discussions centered about the difficult problem of the relation of philosophy and religion. Among the papers presented the present reviewer found Pro- fessor Mercier's "Humanism and Natural Religion" of most in- terest. It treats neither an academic nor a speculative aspect of the problem but rather the approach of the *whole* man to religion. While not in entire agreement with Professor Mercier's position, we think the suggestion of an alliance of philosophy and humanism to attain a "human integralism" points, decidedly and correctly, to a new and much needed synthesis. We also believe that this human integralism would have, as Professor Mercier says, a profound connection with Catholic Action.

We would likewise call attention to Professor Adler's remarks on Catholic universities. While these have retained Scholasticism among their subjects as well as the fundamentals in religion, their philosophy and practice of education have been deeply touched by modern heresies. Have we a philosophy of higher education —aside from the essential ordination to ultimate ends—con- sonant with our philosophy and our religion? "In Catholic universities does philosophy occupy its proper place as the key- stone in the arch of studies? Is the mastery of the liberal Arts the basic requirement of admission to the Catholic university?" (p. 164). We sometimes, it seems, drift with the contem- porary current because we are not sure of our bearings. We need a philosophical compass in our educational work.

R. J. HENLE

